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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TOM EAGLETON AND THE “CURSE TO OUR CONSTITUTION”

WILLIAM H. FREIVOGEL*

INTRODUCTION
If my friend Tom Eagleton had lived a few more months, I’m sure he
would have been amazed—and amused in a Tom Eagleton sort of way—by the
astonishing story of Alberto Gonzales’s late night visit to John Ashcroft’s
hospital bed in 2004 to persuade the then Attorney General to reauthorize the
President’s warrantless wiretapping program. No vignette better encapsulates
President George W. Bush’s perversion of the rule of law.
Not since the Saturday Night Massacre during Watergate has there been a
moment when a President’s insistence on having his way resulted in such
chaos at the upper reaches of the Justice Department. James Comey, the
Deputy Attorney General and a loyal Republican, told Congress in May 2007
how he raced to George Washington Hospital with “sirens blaring” to beat
Gonzales to Ashcroft’s room.1 Comey had telephoned FBI Director Robert S.
Mueller to ask that he too come to the hospital to back up the Justice
Department’s view that the President’s still secret program should not be
reauthorized as it then operated; Ashcroft, Comey, and Mueller held firm in the
face of intense pressure from White House Counsel Gonzales and Chief of
Staff Andrew Card.2 Before the episode was over, the three were on the verge
of tendering their resignations if the White House ignored their objections; the

* William H. Freivogel is director of the School of Journalism at Southern Illinois University
Carbondale and a professor at the Paul Simon Public Policy Institute. Previously he worked for
the St. Louis Post-Dispatch for thirty-four years, serving as deputy Washington bureau chief and
deputy editorial editor. He covered the U.S. Supreme Court while in Washington. A series of
editorials he wrote in 2001 about Attorney General John Ashcroft and civil liberties abuses was a
finalist for the Pulitzer Prize. A series about the Bill of Rights at 200 won the Sigma Delta Chi
Distinguished Service Medal and another about the Constitution won the Benjamin Franklin
award and the ABA’s Silver Gavel award. Freivogel is a graduate of Stanford University and
Washington University School of Law. He is a member of the Missouri Bar.
1. Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales Hospital Episode Detailed, WASH. POST, May 16,
2007, at A1.
2. See id.
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resignations were averted by some last-minute changes in the program—
changes still not public.3
Before Eagleton’s death, he and I had talked often about Bush and
Ashcroft’s overzealous leadership in the war on terrorism. Eagleton even took
a parting shot at Ashcroft in his farewell statement handed out to friends after
his funeral. After calling the Iraq war one of America’s “greatest blunders,” he
added, “[i]t will be remembered, in part, as a curse to our Constitution when
Attorney General John Ashcroft attempted to put a democratic face on
torture.”4 I doubt Eagleton would have changed a word of that critique, despite
Ashcroft’s sickbed conversion to civil liberties.
During my last days writing editorials for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch in
late 2005, Eagleton served as a sounding board helping me formulate a series
of editorials criticizing the way that President Bush had swept away
fundamental notions of justice in pursuing the war on terrorism. This essay is
based on those editorials, which I sent him shortly after I retired in early 2006.
The editorials never ran in the newspaper, but Senator Eagleton read them and
sent back his note of agreement, vowing to use a couple of “gems.” The events
that have transpired since, including Comey’s account of the hospital armtwisting, have only strengthened the conclusion of those editorials: in the war
on behalf of preserving freedom, President Bush has shrunk freedom,
perverted the rule of law and claimed kingly powers.
The war on terrorism is not a war that will be won by the fastest jet, the
most elusive drone, or the smartest bomb. It will not be won by the strongest
army, with the fastest tanks, or the most ambitious military strategy. It won’t
be won on the military battlefield at all. It will be won on the battlefield of
ideas.
President Bush is rightly criticized for the way he has misused and
weakened the mightiest fighting force in the history of the world. But he
warrants a harsher judgment on the pages of history for the way he has
weakened America on the battlefield of ideas.
The United States entered this war as the victim of aggression and the
champion of freedom, self-determination, the rule of law, human rights, and
modernism. We faced an aggressor who had murdered thousands of innocent
civilians in the name of an extremist ideology based on religious
fundamentalism, medieval values, and a disregard for individual liberty,
women’s rights, and democracy.
Yet President Bush has lost the high ground on this battlefield of ideas—
snatching the mantle of the aggressor, undermining the rule of law, trading

3. Id. at A4.
4. 153 CONG. REC. S3265–3266 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2007) (Thomas F. Eagleton’s Farewell
Address).
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liberty for imagined security, and turning his back on a half century of
international law that the United States led the world in creating.
I. SURRENDERING BASIC BELIEFS
In this country, we believe that the government should not snoop on our
conversations unless it convinces an independent magistrate it has reasonable
cause.
In this country, we don’t believe in torturing people to extract confessions,
whether they are street thugs or prisoners of war. We think it is uncivilized
and inhumane and for many decades the United States led the international
effort to banish these practices to the Dark Ages.
In this country, we think people who are locked away have a right to know
what the government thinks they did wrong, to face their accusers in open
court with the help of a lawyer, and to have the matter settled by a neutral
judge.
In this country, we don’t think it’s fair to imprison a person for an act that
wasn’t a crime when it was committed.
In this country, we don’t believe in locking up people for things they say,
even if we find those things repugnant. Other nations, nations in the grip of
dictatorships, do that.
These are beliefs that separate the United States from the world’s petty
tyrants. They are what we mean when we talk about freedom, due process,
human rights, and the rule of law. Yet in his war to protect freedom from
terrorism, President George W. Bush has diminished all of these cherished
values.
He and his two Attorneys General, Ashcroft and Gonzales, have placed
them at risk by:
 Zealously pursuing prosecutions of Muslims not directly connected to the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks or to other plots aimed at the United
5
States.
 Claiming the President can act alone to authorize warrantless wiretaps of
domestic telephone calls in the face of the requirements of the Constitution
6
and the law.

5. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui Life Term Stuns Many in Court, HOUS. CHRON.,
May 4, 2006, at A1.
6. See, e.g., David Jackson, Gore Says Bush Overreaches Authority with Domestic Spying,
USA TODAY, Jan. 17, 2006, at 4A.
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 Asserting the President can act alone to lock up detainees without the
scrutiny of the independent judiciary because the President’s war powers
7
allow him to act as a rule of one when the nation is threatened.
 Insisting that the President can decide by himself to sidestep the human
rights protections of the Geneva Conventions and turn his back on a body
8
of law that the United States proudly helped to create after World War II.
 Claiming the President can authorize the abuse of prisoners in the war on
terrorism, even when that action violates international norms and a law
passed by an overwhelming bipartisan majority of the Senate, which
9
insisted the United States stand four-square against torture.

In short, too many of America’s values have been compromised in a war
on terrorism in which the President has made kingly assertions of possessing
unchecked authority under the President’s war powers. This assertion of vast
authority has upset the checks and balances vital to our constitutional structure.
In their still frightened reactions to the September 11, 2001 attacks, many
Americans have been too willing to overlook how many fundamental
American values are being undermined—due process, open courts, free
expression, fair trials, and human rights, including the belief that torture
destroys the worth and dignity of torturer and victim alike.
These core beliefs—beliefs that the world admired before September 11,
2001—have been bartered away in the name of fighting terrorism. This war
fought in the name of freedom is instead cheapening what it means to live in
the freest nation in the world. If this war is a battle of ideas, as the Cold War
was, then the President has done great damage to the cause he champions.
II. LOSING OUR FREEDOM TO SAVE IT
Conventional wisdom has it that liberty must give way to security in times
of peril. Sometimes that is true. A suspect with knowledge of a ticking
nuclear bomb in an American city wouldn’t have the same rights as a traffic
suspect. After all, as Justice Jackson once famously wrote, we must not
“convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”10
Any president—Republican or Democratic, liberal or conservative—would
have concluded in the wake of 9/11 that the President’s highest duty was to
protect Americans from attack. That impulse—together with the Bush
administration’s belief that it needed to claim back presidential power lost in

7. See, e.g., Charles Lane, High Court Rejects Detainee Tribunals, WASH. POST, June 30,
2006, at A1.
8. E.g., Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007).
9. See, e.g., Josh White, President Relent: Backs Torture Ban, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2005,
at A1.
10. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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the wake of Watergate and Vietnam—combined to form the contours of the
Bush administration’s law enforcement response.
But security can’t always trump freedom. In a dictatorship, security is the
option of first resort. It can’t be that way in a free republic. The true test of
our commitment to liberty is protecting freedom during times when people are
afraid. It’s easy to protect freedom when everyone feels safe.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor made this point in rejecting the
Government’s argument that it could detain without trial an American citizen
named Yaser Hamdi. “It is during our most challenging and uncertain
moments,” she wrote, “that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most
severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment
at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.”11
There are plenty of episodes in American history when great presidents
sacrificed liberty for security. President Bush cites them as justifications for
today’s actions. But history looks back on them as mistakes, not precedents.
The Alien and Sedition Acts made it a crime to criticize President John
Adams.12 President Abraham Lincoln censored the press and suspended the
writ of habeas corpus.13 The Espionage Act of World War I led to the
imprisonment of critics of the draft.14 The Palmer Raids of 1919 locked up
thousands of immigrants on the pretense that they were involved in anarchist
bombings.15 President Franklin Roosevelt set up, and the Supreme Court
permitted, concentration camps for innocent American citizens of Japanese
descent during World War II.16 The government jailed Communist Party
leaders as subversives during the 1940s and ’50s.17 The FBI spied on civil
rights and anti-war leaders in the 1960s.18
It’s easy to see the injustice when looking back. Who watching Good
Night and Good Luck could fail to see the demagoguery of Senator Joseph
McCarthy (R.–Wisc.)? The challenge is to see the injustice in real time even
as the President waves the bloody shirt to justify his assertion of power at the
expense of freedom.

11. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004).
12. 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000).
13. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7 (May 10, 1861), reprinted in 12 Stat. 1260 (1863).
14. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 31–39 (1946).
15. See EDWIN P. HOYT, THE PALMER RAIDS (1969) (detailing the events leading up to the
raids and their aftermath).
16. See MICHI WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S
CONCENTRATION CAMPS (1976)
17. ROBERT K. CARR, THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 1945–1950,
1–18 (Octagon Books 1979) (1952).
18. MICHAEL FRIEDLY & DAVID GALLEN, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: THE FBI FILE 33–43
(1993).
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History can help us ask the right questions: how was Attorney General
John Ashcroft’s decision to round up 5,000 immigrants after 9/11 and to keep
their identities secret different from Attorney General Mitchell Palmer’s
decision to lock up 4,000 alleged communists after his house was bombed in
1919? How is the life sentence for a northern Virginia imam, who urged
young Muslims to join the “jihad,” different from the conviction of members
of the Communist Party for advocating the overthrow of the government in the
frightened ’50s? How is the government’s use of more than a hundred
thousand national security letters to obtain people’s personal correspondence
different from FBI spying during Vietnam? How is Mr. Bush’s assumption of
extraordinary power to authorize warrantless wiretaps, to order the abuse of
prisoners, and to detain suspects without court supervision different from the
powers that Richard M. Nixon assumed during his “imperial presidency?”
III. WARRANTLESS WIRETAPPING IN THE TWILIGHT ZONE OF PRESIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY
Everyone agrees that President George W. Bush had broad constitutional
power in the days and weeks after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to
pursue the terrorists who murdered 3,000 of our fellow citizens.
And everyone agrees that the National Security Agency should listen in on
telephone conversations between al Qaeda operatives and people on U.S. soil.
Where Mr. Bush has exceeded his power is in claiming four, five, and six
years after 9/11 that the President alone has the power to order these wiretaps
without warrants, without a detached magistrate reviewing the government’s
case and without the explicit approval of Congress.19
In making this argument, Mr. Bush threatens to turn the rule of law into
one-man rule.
It’s happened before. During the Korean War, President Harry S. Truman
seized the nation’s steel mills claiming that a threatened nationwide strike
would hurt the national defense.20 Like Mr. Bush, he claimed that his power as
Commander in Chief gave him the authority to act.21
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion rejecting Truman’s steel seizure has
been the touchstone of presidential power ever since. Justice Jackson said the
President’s power is at its maximum when he acts with express or implied
congressional authorization.22 He said the President is in a “zone of twilight”
when there was no authorization.23 And the President’s power is at its “lowest

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Jackson, supra note 6.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952).
Id. at 582.
Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 637.
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ebb” when he acts in the face of express or implied congressional
disagreement.24
The President claims that he acted at the zenith of his power because
Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force resolution three
days after the 9/11 attack.25 The resolution authorized the President to use “all
necessary and appropriate force” to respond to the attacks.26 This, Mr. Bush
claims, was an express approval of his action to order warrantless wiretaps of
conversations between al Qaeda suspects and persons on U.S. soil.27 Signals
intelligence has been important to war efforts all through U.S. history and
warrantless wiretaps of foreign agents have been authorized since at least
Franklin Roosevelt, the President says.28
Critics say that instead of the President acting at the zenith of his powers—
or even the twilight zone like Truman—he was at his lowest ebb because
Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978
requiring warrants from a secret intelligence court for wiretaps of
conversations between intelligence agents and people on U.S. soil.29
The prevailing view among independent legal scholars is that the critics
have the stronger argument.30 The specific FISA law, which directly addresses
wiretaps, trumps the more general war resolution which didn’t specifically say
anything about wiretaps.31 This is why a number of well-respected
Republicans, such as Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania and Lindsey
Graham of South Carolina, have joined Democrats in disputing the legality of
the wiretaps and calling for a congressional response.32 During 2006 hearings
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Republicans and Democrats said they
had no idea they were approving the warrantless wiretapping when they voted
for the war resolution.33

24. Id.
25. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2a, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
26. Id.
27. See Editorial, War Doesn’t Trump Constitution, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 20, 2006,
at 2E.
28. See Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency’s Surveillance
Authority: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12–13 (2006) (statement
of Alberto R. Gonzalez, Att’y Gen. of the United States).
29. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (Supp. IV 2000).
30. See, e.g., Sarah M. Riley, Constitutional Crisis of Deja Vu?: The War Power, The Bush
Administration and the War on Terror, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 701, 735 (2007); John C. Sims, What
NSA Is Doing and Why It’s Illegal, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105, 139 (2006).
31. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Untold Story of al Qaeda’s Administrative Law
Dilemmas, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1302, 1362 (2007).
32. Michael Isikoff et al., Bush’s Bad Connection, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 20, 2006, at 30–32.
33. Wartime Executive Power and the NSA’s Surveillance Authority: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 641 (2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking
Member, S. Judiciary Comm.).
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No one is arguing that wiretaps of suspected al Qaeda agents should not
occur—just that there should be a detached review of the reasonableness of the
wiretaps when they involve conversations on U.S. soil that might involve al
Qaeda. The secret FISA court grants almost all warrants requested.34 For the
administration to argue that its opponents jeopardize national security is a scare
tactic.
It is also a red herring for the President to claim that the disclosure of the
secret wiretap program hurt national security.35 The emptiness of that claim
was apparent when Attorney General Gonzales was asked at Senate hearings if
he thought al Qaeda had been unaware that its phones were tapped. The
Attorney General lamely responded: “It is true that the enemy is presuming
some kind of surveillance, but if they are not reminded of it in the newspapers,
they sometimes forget.”36
One of the President’s most dubious arguments is that he had to ignore the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 because the law is outmoded and
takes too much time and too much proof to get warrants.37 “The FISA law was
written in 1978,” the President said at a press conference. “We’re having this
discussion in 2006. It’s a different world.”38
If the FISA law is too slow, then the President should ask Congress to fix
the problem. That’s the way democracies work. Presidents can’t just decide
that thirty-year-old laws are outmoded and choose to ignore them.
Under the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees that people will be free
from unreasonable searches, the decision to search is supposed to be made by a
detached judge, not a government agent.39 That either means that more judges
will have to be made available to the NSA, or there will have to be improved
oversight of the process to guard against abuses. As the program was set up by
the President, it is too easy for a government agent to wiretap, without a
warrant, conversations between a journalist or a professor, on the one hand,
and a Hamas party official or an Islamic fundamentalist on the other—even
when these Islamic fundamentalists are uninvolved in terrorism.
Before the New York Times published the NSA story, President Bush
warned its top editors at a White House meeting that they would have blood on

34. David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Defending Spy Program, Administration Cites Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A20.
35. George W. Bush, President’s Radio Address (Dec. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051217.html.
36. Tim Grieve, Alberto Gonzales and the Forgetful Terrorists, SALON, Feb. 7, 2006,
available at http://www.salon.com/politics/war_room/2006/02/07/memories/index.html.
37. William Branigin, Bush Opposes Release of Photos With Abramoff, WASH. POST., Jan.
26, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/01/26/AR2006012601228_pf.html.
38. Id.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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their hands if they revealed the secret wiretapping program and there was
another 9/11.40 After publication, Attorney General Gonzales warned that the
disclosure of this and another top-secret program about terrorist financing
might violate the ninety-year-old Espionage Act41—even though the law never
has been used against journalists.42
But the administration has not presented convincing evidence of national
security damage from this or any other leak. At a meeting of law professors in
early 2007 where I was a participant, Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant
Attorney General for the National Security Division, spoke of experiences he
had in criminal cases in which leaks damaged a Justice Department
investigation; but Wainstein’s main examples did not involve national security
cases.43 Wainstein’s national security examples included two old, wellpublicized cases—the Chicago Tribune’s 1942 disclosure that the United
States had broken the Japanese code and the disclosure in the 1970s of CIA
agents’ names by former CIA employee Philip Agee. Nearly all journalists
agree these kinds of disclosures are highly unethical. The one recent example
cited by Wainstein was stories and telephone calls by New York Times
reporters Judith Miller and Philip Shenon in 2001 that tipped off two Islamic
charities that their assets might be frozen by the government.44 No claim was
made that lives were jeopardized.
Viewed with historical distance, the New York Times’s NSA disclosures
are paradigmatic examples of the press performing its watchdog function with
resulting reforms. The administration announced a little more than a year after
the Times’s stories that it would change its secret program to bring it under the
FISA court.45 It remains unclear, however, whether the changes bring the
program in total compliance with the law and the Constitution.46
No one wants to open the door to another 9/11. Everyone wants the
government to connect the dots. But the nation can achieve its security goals
without giving up its cherished freedoms or handing the President monarchical
power.

40. Philip Taubman, Why We Publish Secrets, Address Before the Paul Simon Public Policy
Institute, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, (Sept. 26, 2006).
41. Walter Pincus, Prosecution of Journalists is Possible in NSA Leaks, WASH. POST, May
22, 2006, at A4.
42. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense
Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 938 (1973).
43. Kenneth L. Wainstein, Program of the National Security Law Section, Assoc. of
American Law Schools Meeting (Jan. 4, 2007).
44. Id.
45. Dan Eggen, Court Will Oversee Wiretap Program, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2007, at A1.
46. Id. at A4.
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IV. JAMES OTIS, MEET JOHN DOE
In 1761, James Otis laid the foundation of the right of privacy when he
delivered a five-hour oration to a British colonial court attacking the detested
“writs of assistance” that the British used to search the houses of Bostonians.47
The writs allowed the British to search homes, shops, and ships at any time
for any reason without a warrant.48 Otis said this power threatened to
“annihilate” “one of the most essential branches of English liberty . . . the
freedom of one’s house.” Otis asserts, “It is a power that places the liberty of
every man in the hands of every petty officer.”49 When the new nation wrote a
Bill of Rights, Otis’s sentiments were written into the Fourth Amendment,
which protects people’s homes and papers from unreasonable government
searches.50
Yet today, individual agents of the FBI issue tens of thousands of National
Security Letters every year for all manner of personal information about
people’s private lives.51 No need for a judge. No need to show that a person
might have done something wrong.
If James Otis were alive today he wouldn’t have as much freedom to
contest National Security Letters in federal court as he had to contest writs of
assistance in Britain’s colonial courts. The Patriot Act52 made it a crime for a
person who receives a National Security Letter to publicly disclose it to anyone
other than his lawyer.53 It also gagged the recipient’s lawyer; Otis wouldn’t be
able to say whom he represented. In fact, for a time after the passage of the
Patriot Act, the recipient couldn’t have contacted a lawyer.54
This extraordinary and un-American power was challenged by three
Connecticut librarians, designated John Does in court papers.55 One “John
Doe” is George Christian, executive director of a consortium of libraries called
the Library Connection.56 Christian’s name became public because the
Government failed to blot it out in court filings.57 FBI agents handed Christian

47. National Humanities Institute, James Otis Against Writs of Assistance, February 1761,
available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/writs.htm.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
51. Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A1.
52. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.).
53. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2709(c) (Supp. 2007) (originally enacted as USA Patriot Act of Oct. 26,
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272).
54. Id.
55. Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 68–69 (D. Conn. 2005), dismissed as moot by 449
F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006).
56. Gellman, supra note 51.
57. Id.
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a National Security Letter demanding the names of all persons who used a
particular library computer and warned him to never reveal the request to
anyone.58 Despite Christian’s unveiling, the courts continued to uphold the
fiction that his identity is a state secret.59 The government claimed that
national security would somehow be damaged if his name were revealed.60
National Security Letters were an invention of the 1970s designed for
espionage and terrorism investigations.61 They required the Government to
show a specific link to a suspected foreign agent.62 But the Patriot Act, in
breaking down the wall between intelligence investigations and criminal
investigations, greatly expanded government authority to get private records
about U.S. citizens without any specific link to a suspected terrorist.63
Letters can be issued on the authority of an FBI supervisor without court
supervision, giving the government access to records showing how a person
earns money, whom she lives with, what he reads, whom she communicates
with on the phone or by email, where he buys things online, where she travels,
and how much he gambles and borrows.64 Certain patterns could identify
potential terrorists—or so the argument goes.
The problem is that much of the information concerns citizens who have
no idea they are being scrutinized and have nothing to do with terrorism.
Citizens have no way of knowing that their records have been sucked into the
government’s dragnet; the letters are issued to the businesses that hold the
records, such as bookstores, internet service providers, and credit card
companies. It is illegal for those businesses to tell people that their records are
being sent to the FBI.65 In addition, the records are retained indefinitely
because Attorney General Ashcroft rescinded a 1995 guideline that had
required the letters be destroyed if they proved irrelevant to the purpose for
which they were collected.66
National Security Letters violate American norms of justice in almost
every conceivable way. There is no requirement for probable cause or even
reasonable suspicion.67 People do not know that the government is snooping
on their private lives, and even if they did it is difficult to challenge a National

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 82–83.
Id.
Gellman, supra note 56.
Id. at A10.
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (Supp. 2007).
Gellman, supra note 56, at A10.
Id.
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Security Letter in court. Christian did not know if he could consult a lawyer or
tell his board. 68
Until 2007, no one outside the government knew how many National
Security Letters were issued by the FBI. The Washington Post reported in
2005 that the government is using 30,000 a year.69 The Bush Justice
Department responded to that disclosure by saying that number was
“erroneous,” but refusing to release the right number.70
The number did turn out to be erroneous—erroneously low. A study by
the Justice Department Inspector General Glenn A. Fine found that the number
of National Security Letters rose to 56,000 a year in 2004 from just 8,500
before passage of the Patriot Act.71 Fine also found “widespread and serious
misuse” of the letters by the FBI.72
The recent reauthorization of the Patriot Act fixed some of these problems
by requiring a reasonable amount of evidence that records are relevant to an
investigation and requiring a higher-up in the FBI to approve the letters.73 One
provision allows a recipient of a National Security Letter to contact a lawyer
and to reveal its identity.74 After the revisions, the government admitted that
Christian could seek a lawyer and reveal his name.75 Still, the person whose
records are sought does not find out about the letters, nor have a chance to
challenge the letter in court.
The compromise allows a person who receives a letter to challenge the gag
that prohibits her from telling anyone except her lawyer.76 Within the first
year, a court may set aside the gag if it finds there is “no reason to believe that
disclosure may endanger the national security of the United States, interfere
with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interfere
the diplomatic relations, or endanger the life or physical safety of any
person.”77 But, if the government asserts that disclosure would violate national
security or interfere with diplomatic relations, then the court cannot set aside

68. Id. at A11.
69. Id. at A1.
70. Richard B. Schmitt, The Nation: Was Focus of the Patriot Act Debate a Dodge?, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, at A29.
71. The FBI’s Use of National Security Letters and Section 215 Requests for Business
Records: Hearing Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 5 (2007) (statement of Glenn A.
Fine, Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/testimony/
0703/final.pdf.
72. Id. at 3.
73. USA PATRIOT and Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109177, 120 Stat. 196–97.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (2007).
75. Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 420 (2d Cir. 2006).
76. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
77. Id. § 3511(b)(2).
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the gag unless it finds the government is acting in bad faith.78 After one year,
if the government recertifies the national security danger, that assertion is
considered “conclusive.”79 Judges may not assess the claim’s validity, but
only whether it is made in “bad faith.”80
The compromise was supposed to exempt libraries from receiving National
Security Letters, but the library exemption does not cover internet services at
libraries, such as email.81 Most important, these improvements do not fix the
basic flaw: the government does not have to prove a connection between the
records sought and a terrorist.
Just as the custom house officers entered the colonists’ homes on bare
suspicion, FBI agents rummage through Americans’ private information
unmindful of the cherished liberty lost. As in Mr. Otis’s day, the liberty of
every man is in the hands of every petty officer.
V. SURRENDERING THE MORAL HIGH GROUND
Who would have thought that the day would come when the symbol of
America in parts of the world was the image of a hooded prisoner with his
arms hooked to electrical wires?
Who would have thought that America would run secret prison camps in
Eastern Europe, shuttling nameless detainees through European capitals on
“ghost flights” and using “extraordinary rendition” to send prisoners to
countries notorious for torture?
Who would have thought that the President and the Vice President would
fight a hero and former prisoner of war to preserve the prerogative to treat
prisoners in cruel, inhuman, or degrading ways?
Who would have thought in the days after September 11, 2001 that the
United States would surrender the moral high ground and wind up with the
image of a human rights abuser?
Who would have thought that after a century leading the world’s effort to
bring civilized standards to the treatment of prisoners of war, the United States
would turn its back on the proud accomplishments of Nuremberg and the
Geneva Conventions?
Who would have thought the United States would be the aggressor and
invade another country in a preemptive war that the Secretary General of the
United Nations said was probably illegal?
Yet all of these developments have come to pass as President George W.
Bush has pursued the war on terrorism heedless of history.

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id § 3511(b)(3).
Id.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(f) (2006).
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The great invention of the Nuremberg war crimes trials was that the victors
agreed to submit the fate of evil perpetrators of the Holocaust to the rule of
law.
Robert H. Jackson, the chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, said the decision of
“four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury [to] stay the
hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the
judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever
paid to Reason.”82
For half a century, the world built on this idea that law could punish war
crimes. It was an idea behind the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
Convention Against Torture in 1984.83
But after 9/11, the Bush White House determined that this grand creation
of international justice was “obsolete” in the face of the war on terrorism, and
that Taliban captured in Afghanistan were not entitled to the protection of the
Conventions.84 For the first time in post-World War II history, the United
States refused to extend the protections of the Geneva Conventions to its
opponents on the battlefield, one of several arguments that Secretary of State
Colin Powell made in a memo opposing Gonzales.85 Powell wrote that
Gonzales would “reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in
supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the protections of the law
of war for our troops.”86 In the end, reason surrendered to power and President
Bush adopted Gonzales’s position.87
By denying Geneva protections to the Taliban and other prisoners, Bush
hoped he could use rough interrogations to prevent another 9/11.
Waterboarding—where a prisoner is tied to a board and made to think he is
drowning—elicited information from 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed about possible future terrorist targets; in fact, Mohammed

82. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NÜRNBERG CASE 31 (1947).
83. See Louis-Philippe F. Rouillard, Misinterpreting the Prohibition of Torture Under
International Law: The Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 9, 22–
23 (2005); Samira Shah, On the Road to Apartheid: The Bypass Road Network in the West Bank,
29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 221, 245 (1997).
84. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to George W. Bush,
President of the United States, Decision Regarding Application of the Geneva Convention on
Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in THE
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 118–19 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel
eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS].
85. Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, to Counsel to the President and
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Draft Decision Memorandum for the
President on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 25,
2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 84, at 122–23.
86. Id. at 123.
87. THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 84, at xiv.
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admitted to involvement in so many plots—thirty-one in all—that some
experts on interrogations questioned whether he was giving reliable
confessions.88
Tortured confessions often are unreliable.89 The Bush administration’s
pre-war claim that Iraq was helping al Qaeda make bombs of poisons and
gases came from a Libyan prisoner handed over to Egypt for interrogation
under a process called extraordinary rendition; the prisoner later said he made
up the claim to avoid Egyptian torture.90 But by that time, President Bush had
used the information to justify invading Iraq.91
The unreliability of confessions induced by torture is one reason the British
House of Lords ruled in 2005 that the government could not use that evidence
in court.92 Lord Bingham wrote that the English common law had “set its face
firmly against the use of torture” for more than 300 years: “[T]he common law
was moved by the cruelty of the practice . . . by the inherent unreliability of
confessions . . . and by the belief that it degraded all who lent themselves to
[it].”93
President Bush, when he made his initial decision to use brutal
interrogation techniques, probably did not foresee that opening the dungeon
door would lead inevitably to Abu Ghraib. But there is no excuse now for
failing to recognize the cause-and-effect relationship he set in motion.
Yet, to this day, the President has refused to take responsibility for the
mistreatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. He has blamed
renegade military police while trotting out multiple Pentagon investigations to
whitewash the responsibility of higher-ups for the Abu Ghraib scandal.94
In fact, the responsibility lies squarely with President Bush, Vice President
Dick Cheney, Alberto Gonzales, and former Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld. In the face of complaints from FBI agents and principled objections
by top military lawyers,95 administration hawks allied with the Vice President

88. Nick Gillespie, Is Khalid Sheikh Mohammed a Bullshitter?, REASON MAGAZINE, March
16, 2007 available at http://www.reason.com/blog/printer/119157.html.
89. Stephanos Bibas, The Rehnquist Court's Fifth Amendment Incrementalism, 74 GEO
WASH. L. REV. 1078, 1083 (2006).
90. Douglas Jehl, Qaeda-Iraq Link U.S. Cited Is Tied to Coercion Claim, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
9, 2005 at A1.
91. Id. at A14.
92. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] UKHL 71 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(U.K.).
93. Id. at 5–6.
94. Marcy Strauss, The Lessons of Abu Ghraib, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1269, 1275–76 (2005).
95. Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse and Torture of
Detainees was Thwarted, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32–33.
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and Secretary Rumsfeld approved brutal interrogation techniques that were
employed at Guantanamo Bay and that later migrated to Abu Ghraib.96
The New Yorker recounted in 2006 the frustrating attempts of Alberto J.
Mora, retired General Counsel of the Navy, to stop the brutality.97
In December, 2002, Navy criminal investigators brought to Mora their
concerns about abusive interrogations at Guantanamo.98 Mora, a rock-ribbed
Bush Republican, was shocked to discover that Rumsfeld had approved
hooding to exploit phobias, stress positions, deprivation of light—all forbidden
practices that could subject military interrogators to prosecution under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.99
Pentagon and Justice Department lawyers had invented elaborate rationales
to justify the practices. Pentagon lawyer, Lt. Col. Diane Beaver, suggested that
interrogators could get immunity in advance from their superiors.100 Justice
Department lawyer John Yoo wrote an Office of Legal Counsel opinion that
the President’s war power permitted him to authorize “cruel, inhumane, and
degrading treatment” of prisoners.101 Mora says that Yoo told him point blank
that the President could authorize “torture.”102
Mora disagreed. He said the international conventions ratified by the
Senate had the force of law that bound President and interrogator alike.103
After this quiet, behind-the-scenes debate with internal critics, Bush and
Cheney fought a loud, public battle with Senator John McCain, R.-Ariz., trying
for months during 2005 to defeat his legislative ban on “cruel, inhuman or
degrading” interrogations.104
From the beginning of the war on terrorism, the Bush administration had
taken the view that the President has sole authority to decide how enemy
combatants in the war on terrorism would be interrogated. In a 2002 memo
justifying abusive interrogation techniques, the Justice Department said,
“Congress can no more interfere with the President’s conduct of the
interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate strategic or tactical
decisions on the battlefield.”105 The memo went on to say, remarkably, that

96. Id. at 33, 40.
97. Id. at 32–33.
98. Id. at 35–36.
99. Id. at 35.
100. Mayer, supra note 95, at 35.
101. Id. at 38.
102. Id. at 39.
103. Id. at 41.
104. Tim Golden & Eric Schmitt, Detainee Policy Sharply Divides Bush Officials: New
Military Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1.
105. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 84, at
207.
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“[p]hysical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the
pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment
of bodily function, or even death.”106
Senator McCain was tortured as a prisoner of war in Vietnam.107 He
recalled in a Senate speech that one inner belief that sustained him and other
POWs was that “every one of us . . . knew and took great strength from the
belief that we were different from our enemies. . . .”108
When it became clear that the McCain anti-torture provision would pass,
President Bush agreed to sign it.109 But what he gave with the signing pen he
took back with a signing statement.110 The statement said he would interpret
the McCain ban “consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to
supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and
consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power.”111
In other words, the President could authorize any interrogation technique
he thought was necessary, and there was nothing Congress or the courts could
do about it.
Alberto Mora thinks that the decision of top officials to authorize abuse
was as morally reprehensible as the actual torture at Abu Ghraib:
If cruelty is no longer declared unlawful, but instead is applied as a matter of
policy, it alters the fundamental relationship of man to government. . . . The
Constitution recognizes that man has an inherent right . . . to personal dignity,
112
including the right to be free of cruelty. It applies to all human beings. . . .

If we do not preserve this special relationship between man and
government, if we do not preserve the unique quality that sustained John
McCain in a Hanoi prison, then we will have lost that precious intangible that
we are fighting the war on terrorism to preserve—our nation’s belief that the
rule of law protects the inherent worth and dignity of every person against
abusive governments, maniacal dictators, murderous ideologies, and even
democratically elected presidents of the freest country in the world.
Just as President Bush has claimed unlimited presidential power to order
abusive interrogation techniques, he also has claimed it for the process, or lack
thereof, available to those detained as enemy combatants. He asserted that he

106. Id. at 172.
107. Richard Simon, Senate Bucks White House on Detainee Rules: McCain Invokes His
Time as a POW to Help Pass a Measure that Would Set Standards on How Prisoners Should Be
Interrogated, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at A12.
108. Id.
109. Jamie Mayerfeld, Playing by Our Own Rules: How U.S. Marginalization of
International Human Rights Law Led to Torture, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 89, 104 (2007).
110. Id. at 104–05.
111. Id. at 104.
112. Mayer, supra note 95, at 35.
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could create military tribunals to try the enemy combatants—tribunals that lack
so many of the elements of due process that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled they
did not comply with the Constitution.113 The tribunals do not allow the
accused to confront key accusers or to know secret evidence against them; they
also do not guarantee the right to a lawyer, do not allow lawyers full access to
clients, and deny the Great Writ of habeas corpus.114 In Hamdi, Justice
O’Connor rejected this assertion of presidential authority. The Court held that
citizens held as enemy combatants must have a “fair opportunity to rebut” the
government’s claims.115
The U.S. Supreme Court also rejected President Bush’s broad claim of
executive power in the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision in 2006, ruling that the
President could not, on his own, set up tribunals to try enemy combatants and
could not ignore the Geneva Conventions when Congress said that
international law applied to such tribunals.116 The President responded by
asking Congress to pass the Military Commission Act, and a Congress of
Republicans and cowed Democrats approved the law.117 The Democrats in
Congress were especially timid because the bill came up in the late summer
and early fall and appeared to be an attempt to make Democrats appear weak
on terrorism as the 2006 congressional elections approached.118 The law
overturned Hamdan and stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
habeas corpus appeals from alien enemy combatants, whether they have been
found by the Combat Status Review Tribunal to have been properly detained
or whether they are awaiting that determination.119
This was an extraordinary law. As Berkeley Law Professor and
constitutional expert Jesse Choper put it, except in isolated cases during the
Civil War and World War II, “Congress had never engaged in clear removal of
cases from the Supreme Court or the lower federal courts.”120

113. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532–33 (2004) (plurality opinion).
114. See id. at 529–539.
115. Id. at 533.
116. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759–60 (2006), superseded by
statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2625.
117. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2625; Erwin
Chemerinsky, Presidential Powers Including Military Tribunals in the October 2005 Term, 22
TOURO L. REV. 897, 909 (2007).
118. Editorial, Profiles in Cowardice: On Prisoner Abuse and Detention. President Bush
Finds Enablers in Both Parties, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2006, at B6.
119. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2635 (stating in
Section 7 that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was amended by inserting a new subsection (e)).
120. Jesse Choper & John Yoo, Wartime Process: A Dialogue on Congressional Power to
Remove Issues from the Federal Courts, 95 CAL. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=975315.
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It should never be possible for Congress to remove a whole category of
cases from the jurisdiction of all federal courts, inferior and supreme. To allow
such a law to stand would seriously undermine the checks and balances of the
Constitution, already seriously eroded by Congress’s failure to check the
President’s excessive assertions of authority.
A brave member of the Army Reserve who was involved in handling the
cases of the detainees—Lt. Col. Stephen Abraham—has filed an affidavit with
the U.S. Supreme Court that paints a highly damaging picture of the operation
of the President’s tribunals.121 He says that intelligence officials assembling
the case against detainees would not assure him that they had provided any
exculpatory evidence.122 More damaging, he told of serving on one of the
review boards and concluding along with fellow board members that the
government had not provided enough proof that one particular detainee was an
enemy combatant.123 When the board made that ruling, it was told to take
another look.124 It stood by its decision, but Abraham was never again put on
one of the boards.125
At the end of the Supreme Court’s 2006–2007 term, it agreed to hear the
case to decide if detainees have a right to challenge their detention in American
courts.126
VI. CHASING PHANTOMS
The First Amendment says that people generally cannot be put in prison
for things they say.127 But Ali al Timimi, an imam from northern Virginia,
faces life in prison without parole for words spoken over dinner to followers
who never attacked the United States.128
The Fifth Amendment says every suspect has a right to remain silent.129
But, the Bush administration outsourced the Fifth Amendment to Saudi
Arabian security police who secured a confession from Ahmed Omar Abu Ali
for plotting to kill the President.130

121. Brief of Petitioners in Reply to Opposition to Petition for Rehearing at app. at i–viii, Al
Odah v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 3067 (2007) (No. 06-1196).
122. Id. at iv.
123. Id. at vi–vii.
124. Id. at vii.
125. Id.
126. William Glaberson, In Shift, Justices Agree to Review Detainees’ Case: Guantánamo
Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at A1.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
128. James Dao, Muslim Cleric Found Guilty in the “Virginia Jihad” Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
27, 2005, at A12.
129. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
130. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 100 AM. J.
INTL’L L. 690, 723 (2006).
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The American legal system insists that people are innocent until proven
guilty.131 But under the Patriot Act, the Bush administration put Illinois
charities out of business for alleged ties to al Qaeda, which were never proven
in court.132
The Constitution bans ex post facto laws because we do not believe that
people can be sent to prison for acts that were not illegal when they
occurred.133 But the government prosecuted two former college professors for
aiding Palestinian groups that were not considered terrorist organizations at the
time of their assistance.134
Perhaps, if the Bush-Ashcroft-Gonzales tactics had clearly made us safer
from the people who murdered our brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers,
sons and daughters on 9/11, their legal tactics might somehow be forgiven.
But there is little evidence that the prosecutions have made us safer because
few of those convicted were plotting to kill Americans.
The Justice Department says it foiled a number of possible attacks,
including one involving Iyman Faris, an Ohio trucker, who pleaded guilty in
2003 to involvement in an al Qaeda plot to bring down the Brooklyn Bridge.135
In recent cases, where cells of would-be terrorists have been rightfully arrested,
those plotting attacks on soldiers at Fort Dix and fuel tanks at JFK airport in
New York were far from having the means to carry out their evil intentions.136
With Attorney General Alberto Gonzales flanking him, President Bush
claimed in 2005 that “federal terrorism investigations have resulted in charges
against more than 400 suspects, and more than half of those charged have been
convicted.”137
But a study by Syracuse University and an analysis by The Washington
Post found that few “terrorism” cases actually were related to terrorism.138

131. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895); see also, U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S.
CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
132. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING 87 (2004) [hereinafter MONOGRAPH].
133. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
134. See Viet D. Dinh & Wendy J. Keefer, FISA and the PATRIOT Act: A Look Back and a
Look Forward, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. xxv (2006).
135. Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, Prepared Remarks at the American
Enterprise Institute (May 24, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/
dag_speech_060524.html.
136. Bruce Schneier, Portrait of the Modern Terrorist as an Idiot, WIRED, June 14, 2007,
available
at
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/06/
securitymatters_0614.
137. George W. Bush, President of the United States, Remarks to the Ohio State Highway
Patrol Academy (June 9, 2005) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/
print/20050609-2.html.
138. Dan Eggen, Terrorism Prosecutions Drop: Analysis Shows a Spike After 9/11, Then a
Steady Decline, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2006, at A6; Criminal Terrorism Enforcement in the
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The Post found that 39 people, not 200, had been convicted of crimes related
to terrorism or national security.139 Syracuse University, which provides the
most reliable study of Justice Department statistics, found that the average
sentence in “terrorism” cases after 9/11 was just twenty-eight days and that the
median sentence was zero because most charges were dismissed.140 Only one
percent of the 6,500 terrorism or anti-terrorism criminal referrals resulted in
sentences of twenty or more years.141 Nearly four out of five of these referrals
were dropped before trial; of the nearly 1,400 sentenced, only 67 received
sentences of five or more years.142 The Syracuse researchers also found that
the initial surge of “terrorism” prosecutions immediately after 9/11 has ended
and that the current level of prosecutions is closer to the pre-9/11 level.143 The
researchers point out that this raises questions about the post-9/11 surge
because the threat of terrorism is not thought to have decreased since then.144
A pattern has become disconcertingly familiar. The government makes
alarming claims of terrorist plots. Then the facts fall short of the sensational
claims. Attorney General Ashcroft warned of a dirty bomb plot by Jose
Padilla, and the government held the U.S. citizen145 in a Navy brig for three
years before filing charges that had nothing to do with a dirty bomb plot.146
The bait and switch left one of Bush’s favorite judges, J. Michael Luttig,
wondering whether the military detention was justified and led him to write
that there had been a “substantial cost to the government’s credibility”
resulting in the government’s long detention of Padilla for alleged terrorist
plans it did not prove in court.147
Ashcroft warned that an Oregon lawyer was connected to the Madrid
terrorist bombing, but that was based on an FBI mistake.148 He claimed that a
Detroit cell endangered Americans, but a judge threw out the convictions of

United States During the Five Years Since the 9/11/01 Attacks, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Sept. 4, 2006), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/
terrorism/169/ [hereinafter Criminal Terrorism Enforcement].
139. Dan Eggen & Julie Tate, U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on Terrorism
Charges, WASH. POST, June 12, 2005, at A1.
140. Criminal Terrorism Enforcement, supra note 138.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. William H. Freivogel, Mr. Ashcroft Exits, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 11, 2004, at
C10.
146. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 2005).
147. Id. at 587.
148. Freivogel, supra note 145, at C20.
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two Muslim men because prosecutors ignored evidence that did not fit their
theory.149
Twenty of the Government’s terrorism convictions are for Iraqi men who
pleaded guilty in a Pennsylvania truck licensing scheme, but the scheme had
nothing to do with terrorism.150 Six Yemini men from Lackawanna, New York
were convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda because they
attended training camps overseas, but that was before 9/11 and the men never
took steps toward a terrorist act.151
Even in its showcase prosecution of the so-called paintball jihadists of
Northern Virginia where the government won eight convictions, the so-called
terrorists never posed a threat to an American citizen here or abroad.152
The imam at the center of the prosecution of the “Virginia jihadists” was
Ali al Timimi, a Ph.D. cancer researcher who was an influential leader of
young American Muslims at a store front mosque in Falls Church, Virginia153
One follower was Randall “Ismail” Royer, a graduate of Parkway South in
affluent west St. Louis County.154 He pleaded guilty to violating the seldomenforced Neutrality Act of 1794155 to support Lashkar e-Taiba, a militant
Muslim group fighting for the independence of Kashmir from India.156 The
following account of the prosecution of al Timimi and other Muslims in
America is largely based on excellent reporting by a former colleague of mine
at the Post-Dispatch, Jon Sawyer, now director of the Pulitzer Center on Crisis
Reporting; Sawyer, like Eagleton, served as a muse for the ill-fated editorials I
wrote for the Post-Dispatch.
Royer and the other conspirators allegedly trained at a paintball course in
the woods. He and three others went to a Lashkar camp in 2001, before
December 2001 when the Lashkar group was declared a terrorist organization
for attacking the Indian Parliament. Prosecutors maintained that training with
the group amounted to an “attack” on India in violation of the Neutrality
Act.157
Two of the men who traveled to Pakistan after 9/11 got reduced sentences
by pleading guilty and testifying against Timimi.158 They testified that at a

149. Id.
150. Eggen & Tate, supra note 139, at A18.
151. See Freivogel, supra note 145.
152. Id.
153. See Dao, supra note 128.
154. Jon Sawyer, Muslims and America: Ex-St. Louisan Caught in Post 9/11 Net (pt. 4), ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 7, 2005, at A11.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (2000); Sawyer, supra note 154.
156. Jon Sawyer, Muslims and America: Mosque Feels the Pressure of Prosecutions (pt. 3),
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 6, 2005, at A8 (hereinafter Mosque Feels Pressure).
157. Sawyer, supra note 154.
158. Mosque Feels Pressure, supra note 156.
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private dinner five days after 9/11, Timimi had told them that it was their
religious duty to fight for Islam abroad and that this included defending the
Taliban against U.S. forces.159 AL Timimi claims he told his followers to go
abroad to guard against an anti-Muslim backlash in the United States.160 In
any event, none of the followers fought against the United States or U.S.
allies.161
For his words—and his words alone—Timimi was convicted of inciting
his followers to wage war against the United States.162 U.S. District Judge
Leonie M. Brinkema called the life sentence she imposed “very draconian,”
but said her hands were tied by federal sentencing rules involving gun
crimes.163
Speech alone can sometimes be illegal, but only when it incites a person to
an imminent criminal act.164 Based on the evidence, an attack on American
troops or U.S. soil never was imminent or even planned. The U.S. Supreme
Court should review al Timimi’s trial and “draconian” sentence.
The prosecutor in the case was U.S. Attorney Paul McNulty, who later
became Deputy Attorney General with hardly a murmur of criticism from
either Democrats or Republicans in the Congress.165 He said Timimi deserved
the life sentence because he was “a kingpin of hate against America and
everything we stand for, especially our freedom.”166
AL Timimi made an eloquent statement to the court, quoting from the
Constitution and Socrates.167 Previously, he had pointed out that he had “never
owned or used a gun, never traveled to a military camp, never set foot in a
country in which a war was taking place, never raised money for any violent
organization.”168 For his conviction to stand, he said:

159. Dao, supra note 128.
160. Id.
161. See Mosque Feels Pressure, supra note 156. However, two of the defendants received
reduced sentences after pleading guilty to charges that included “contemplat[ing] fighting with
the Taliban against U.S. forces.” Id.
162. See Debra Erdley & Betsy Hiel, Islamic Cleric Gets Life in Prison, TRIB.-REV., July 14,
2005, at A6.
163. See Jerry Markon, Muslim Lecturer Sentenced to Life, WASH. POST, July 14, 2005, at
B1.
164. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969).
165. See Peter Hardin, Capitol Update: Virginians in Washington, RICHMOND TIMESDISPATCH, Feb. 19, 2006, at A6 (McNulty “advanced easily through the Senate Judiciary
Committee” with “kind words from several senior Democrats.”); Peter Hardin, Close Scrutiny for
Nominee, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 19, 2006, at B1.
166. Dao, supra note 128.
167. Erdley & Hiel, supra note 162.
168. Milton Viorst, The Education of Ali Al-Timimi, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2006, at 78.
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[T]wo hundred and thirty years of America’s tradition of protecting the
individual from the tyrannies and whims of the sovereign will have come to an
end. And that which is exploited today to persecute a single member of a
169
minority will most assuredly come back to haunt the majority tomorrow.

VII. OUTSOURCING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Ahmed Abu Ali—a pious twenty-four year old Muslim American who
grew up in northern Virginia before studying in Saudi Arabia—was convicted
late in 2005 of plotting to assassinate President George W. Bush and hijack
commercial airliners.170 The conviction was based almost entirely on a
confession he made while in custody of the Mubahith, Saudi Arabia’s state
security service known for torturing prisoners.171
Prosecutor McNulty said the verdict “firmly established Abu Ali as a
dangerous terrorist who posed a grave threat to our national security.”172 But
the trial violated important standards of American justice. Again, this account
is based on excellent stories by Sawyer, with additional information from
original court documents.
The trial was conducted under the pretense that Americans had nothing to
do with Abu Ali’s detention in Saudi Arabia, even though Saudi officials told
news organizations that they were holding him for U.S. convenience.173 FBI
agents on the scene fed questions to Saudi interrogators and watched behind
one-way glass.174
The judge, Gerald Bruce Lee, allowed the prosecution to introduce Abu
Ali’s confession as “voluntary,” despite Abu Ali’s claim that Saudi
interrogators “whipped” him, slapped him in the face, pulled his beard, ears
and hair, kicked him in the stomach, and put him in a cell that was lit twentyfour hours a day.175 A U.S. doctor confirmed ten linear scars on his back
consistent with whipping.176 The jury convicted Abu Ali without knowing that
Saudi Arabia has a history of torturing prisoners.177

169. Ross E. Getman, Esq., The Faithful Spy: Amerithrax Spoiler Alert, GLOBAL POLITICIAN,
April 23, 2007, available at http://www.globalpolitician.com.
170. Jerry Markon, Virginia Man Convicted in Plot to Kill Bush, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2005,
at A1.
171. See Jon Sawyer, Abu Ali Case Shows U.S. Outsourcing Dirty Work, Some Say, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 4, 2005, at B4 [hereinafter Abu Ali Case] (discussing jurors’
reliance on Abu Ali’s videotaped confession in finding him guilty).
172. Id. at B1.
173. See id. at B4.
174. Id.
175. U.S. v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 343–44, 373 (E.D. Va. 2005).
176. Id. at 362.
177. See Abu Ali Case, supra note 171.
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Ever since the Bill of Rights was written, it has stood for the principle that
the federal government cannot force a suspect to be a witness against
himself.178 It is a principle that is essential to a government that respects the
integrity and dignity of the individual over the demands of the state. If the
conviction of Abu Ali stands, the Fifth Amendment has become a meaningless
anachronism in the war on terrorism.
VIII. ABUSING THE PATRIOT ACT
Former Attorney General Ashcroft pointed to the prosecution of two
former college professors as Patriot Act success stories.179 The professors are
Abdelhaleem Ashqar, a former Howard University professor, and Sami AlArian, a former computer professor at the University of South Florida at
Tampa.180
The Patriot Act opened up to prosecutors a trove of secret wiretaps
collected by intelligence agents.181 But critics point out that charges against
both men are based upon decade-old actions that were not illegal at the time.182
Mr. Ashqar, who lives in northern Virginia, grew up on the West Bank.183
His grandfather was jailed by the Ottoman Empire.184 His father was jailed by
the British Empire.185 Mr. Ashqar himself was jailed by Israel.186 Finally, he
was brought to trial in America.187 The government charged that in the early
1990s, as a student at the University of Mississippi, Mr. Ashqar helped launder
one million dollars for Hamas.188 The evidence came from FBI wiretaps and a
break-in at his apartment.189 The searches were conducted as intelligence
operations without search warrants at a time when the United States did not
consider Hamas a terrorist group.190 In early 2007, a jury found Ashqar

178. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
179. See Mosque Feels Pressure, supra note 156; Spencer S. Hsu, Former Florida Professor
to Be Deported, WASH. POST, April 18, 2006, at A3.
180. Mosque Feels Pressure, supra note 156; Don Wycliff, Another Hard Look at the Patriot
Act, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 2003, at C27.
181. See Hsu, supra note 179.
182. See e.g., Tim Padgett & Rochelle Renfor, Fighting Words, TIME, Feb. 4, 2002, at 56
(discussing how Al-Arian was investigated for several years but never charged with anything
until the Patriot Act was passed); Mosque Feels Pressure, supra note 156 (stating that Ashqar’s
actions in support of Hamas “all took place before . . . Hamas was officially designated a terrorist
group by the United States”).
183. Mosque Feels Pressure, supra note 156, at A9.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Matt O’Connor, Acquittal Just Latest Setback in Courts, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 2, 2007, at 14.
188. Mosque Feels Pressure, supra note 156, at A8.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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innocent of the most serious charge against him, racketeering, convicting him
on lesser charges that should result in a shorter prison sentence.191 The
government used the same approach in the al Arian case, and failed to
convince a jury there too.192 Mr. al Arian was acquitted in December, 2005 of
eight counts growing out of the Government claim that he conspired to commit
terrorist murders in Israel as the U.S. boss of the Islamic Jihad.193 The jury
could not reach a verdict on nine other charges and al Arian subsequently
agreed to a plea bargain and was deported.194
The government had been investigating Mr. al Arian since shortly after he
arrived at the university in 1986.195 His fiery speeches called for “death to
But he considered himself an “enlightened Islamist” and
Israel.”196
campaigned for George W. Bush in 2000.197 He publicly condemned the 9/11
attacks.198 Time Magazine reported that an FBI supervisor involved in the case
was “in shock” when he received the “marching orders” from Mr. Ashcroft to
build a case against Mr. al Arian.199
Much of the evidence presented at trial involved fundraising from the early
1990s that was not illegal then.200 The judge insisted that the government
prove that Mr. al Arian knew he was funding the terrorist activities of Islamic
Jihad.201 It could not.202 Jurors said they acquitted Mr. al Arian because a jury
instruction told them, “Our law does not criminalize beliefs or mere
membership in an organization.”203
The government used another provision of the Patriot Act to destroy two
Illinois charities by freezing their assets.204 The investigations of Global Relief
and Benevolence International were based partly on an uncorroborated CIA tip
in late 2001 that Global Relief was involved in a plot to attack the United
States with weapons of mass destruction.205 The government entered the

191. See O’Connor, supra note 187.
192. Tim Padgett & Wendy Malloy, When Terror Charges Just Won’t Stick, TIME, Dec. 19,
2005, at 46.
193. O’Connor, supra note 187; Id.
194. Hsu, supra note 179, at A3.
195. Padgett & Malloy, supra note 192, at 47.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Padgett & Malloy, supra note 192, at 47.
201. Id.
202. See id.
203. Meg Laughlin, For Justice, Jurors Put Lives on Hold, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 11,
2005, at A1.
204. See Laurie Cohen, 9/11 Panel Faults Probe of 2 Charities, CHI. TRIB., Aug 24, 2004, at
1.
205. Id. at 12.
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offices of Global Relief and Benevolence International around the world to
swab for evidence of WMDs.206 Failing to find evidence, the government used
its new Patriot Act powers to freeze the charities’ assets while it tried to build
criminal cases.207 The Justice Department did not file charges against Global
Relief,208 but locked up a top Global fund-raiser, Rabih Haddad.209
Mr. Haddad was a respected moderate religious leader in Ann Arbor,
Michigan.210 He was placed in solitary confinement while awaiting a closed
hearing,211 and was eventually deported for a minor visa violation.212 In a
jailhouse letter to “Lady Liberty,” Mr. Haddad said that America’s vision of
liberty had once “swept me up in a tornado of hope, dreams, and
inspiration . . . . Little did I know that I will be persecuted in your
name . . . .”213
U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald won an indictment of the director of
Benevolence International, Enaam Arnaout.214 Mr. Ashcroft personally
traveled to Chicago to announce the indictment, stressing the organization’s
links to al Qaeda.215 The 9/11 Commission concluded that “the indictment . . .
contained almost no specific allegations that [the group] funded al Qaeda.”216
Eventually, Arnaout pled guilty to diverting charitable funds to Bosnian
fighters—whom the United States supported —but the Government dropped
all counts related to terrorism and al Qaeda.217 The 9/11 Commission
concluded that the Patriot Act powers wielded so powerfully by the
government had “potentially dangerous applications when applied to domestic
institutions.”218 Organizations can be shut down on a single official’s say-so

206. See id. (noting that the in December of 2001 the government “orchestrated raids on
foreign offices of both charities”).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Soojung Chang, Haddad Deported, A2 Rallies to His Support, MICH. DAILY, July 21,
2003, at 1.
210. See Rob Goodspeed, Officials Claim Haddad Group Tied to Terrorists, MICH. DAILY,
Mar. 29, 2002, at 1.
211. Jeremy Berkowitz, Haddad Transferred Out of Solitary Confinement, MICH. DAILY,
Mar. 19, 2002, at 1.
212. Chang, supra note 209.
213. Rabih Haddad, Letter to the Editor, An Open Letter to “Lady Liberty”, ANN ARBOR
NEWS, Jan. 13, 2002 at C6.
214. Cohen, supra note 204, at 12. (“Arnaout . . . later pleaded guilty to defrauding donors to
the charity by diverting money to Islamic fighters in Bosnia and Chechnya, but the government
dropped allegations that he aided terrorists.”).
215. Wycliff, supra note 180.
216. MONOGRAPH, supra note 132, at 104.
217. Cohen, supra note 204, at 12.
218. MONOGRAPH, supra note 132, at 112.
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based on a newspaper article, hearsay, or classified evidence that the group
never sees.219
It is a process that makes a mockery of due process. The criticism of the
Bush administration’s prosecutions of Arab-Americans has not gotten much
attention. Most of us have trouble empathizing with radical Islamists. But
American values, not Islamic values, are at stake when the government distorts
the law to imprison people only vaguely tied to the war on terrorism. Only real
and present threats to American lives and institutions justify restrictions on
liberty or special procedures that bypass the protections of the legal system.
When the government surrenders freedom in pursuit of phantom threats, it
diverts resources from the real culprits and jeopardizes the core values that we
are fighting this war to preserve.
CONCLUSION
Justice Jackson, more than any other American jurist, grasped the
important issues of presidential power and the need to temper victors’ justice
with international law. He served as the chief prosecutor at Nuremberg and
also wrote the Court’s definitive opinion on presidential war power in the Steel
Seizure case.220 To paraphrase Justice Jackson’s words at Nuremberg—for a
great and powerful nation to abide by the rule of law at a time when it is most
tempted to abandon law is a victory of reason over power.221 It is a victory of
modernity over the Dark Ages. It is the victory of the pen and the word
processor over the dungeon. It is the victory of civilization over barbarity.
This submission of power to the rule of law is what protects liberty of the
individual. To abandon the law and surrender liberty to fear is to give the
terrorists a victory on the battlefield that matters and on which this war will be
decided—the battlefield of ideas.
George Bush, Dick Cheney, John Ashcroft, and Alberto Gonzales do not
understand what important freedoms they are sacrificing by turning their backs
on basic American values of justice. Tom Eagleton not only understood, but
he lived a life and charted a political career anchored in the verities of
American justice.

219. Id.
220. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–55 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
221. For a complete reading of Jackson’s opening statement at Nuremburg, see ROBERT H.
JACKSON, THE NÜRNBERG CASE 30–94 (1947).

